Mark Graham v. Utah Air Quality Board : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Mark Graham v. Utah Air Quality Board : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joro Walker; Land and Water Fund of the Rockies; Attorney for Petitioner.
Richard Rathbun; Assistant Attorneys General; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Graham v. Utah Air Quality Board, No. 20000042 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2577
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK GRAHAM, 
Petitioner, Case No. 2000 0042 
vs. : 
UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD, Priority No 14 
Respondent 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
MARK GRAHAM 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF 
THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
(Case Below No. 9903004) 
Attorney for Petitioner Mark Graham 
JORO WALKER USB #6676 
LAND AND WATER FUND OF THE ROCKIES 
2056 East 3300 South, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Phone: (801)487-9911 
Attorneys for Respondent UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
RICHARD RATHBUN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PO Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 
Phone: 801-366-0290 
FILED , 
=•• Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 1 7 2000 
Pauletie Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK GRAHAM, 
Petitioner, Case No. 2000 0042 
vs. : 
UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD, Priority No 14 
Respondent : 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
MARK GRAHAM 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF 
THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
(Case Below No. 9903004) 
Attorney for Petitioner Mark Graham 
JORO WALKER USB #6676 
LAND AND WATER FUND OF THE ROCKIES 
2056 East 3300 South, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Phone: (801)487-9911 
Attorneys for Respondent UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
RICHARD RATHBUN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PO Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 
Phone: 801-366-0290 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATUTORY PROVISION 2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46B-9 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3. 
RESPONSE TO AIR BOARD'S 6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 12 
CONCLUSION..... 16 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 17 
i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Cache County v. Property Tax Division of Utah State Tax 6 
Commission. 922 P.2d 758 (Utah 1996) 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Jennings. 816 F.2d 1488 5 
(10th Cir. 1987) 
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services. 3,4, 8, 9 
U.S. , 120 S.Ct. 693,145 L.Ed. 2d 610 (2000) 
Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) 14, 15 
Millard County v. Utah State Tax Commission. 823 P.2d 459 5, 6 
(Utah.1991) 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States 8 
Environmental Protection Agency. 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 
1974) 
Sierra Club v. Morton. 405 U.S. 727. 735 (1972) 8 
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus. 602 F.Supp. 892 (N.D.CA 1984) 8, 9 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166 3,4 
(Utah 1987) 
Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry. 716 P.2d 796 11,14,15 
(Utah 1986)... 
Texans United for a Safe Economy Education Fund v. Crown 8 
Central Petroleum Corp. 207 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 2000) 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9 (1996) 2-16 
iii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK GRAHAM, 
Petitioner, Case No. 2000 0042 
vs. : 
UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD, Priority No 14 
Respondent : 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
MARK GRAHAM 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF 
THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
(Case Below No. 9903004) 
Appellant, Mark Graham by and through counsel of record, submits 
the following REPLY Brief of Appellant in further support of his petition for 
review of a decision by the Utah Air Quality Board (the "Air Board") to 
deny him the right to intervene in formal proceeding to resolve a notice of 
violation ("NOV") issued against Wasatch Energy Systems ("WES"), a 
dioxin-emitting facility in Mr. Graham's neighborhood: 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9 (1996): 
(i) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in 
a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who 
wishes to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each party. The 
petition shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the proceeding; 
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights 
or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative 
proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under 
any provision of law; and 
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency. 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if he [sic] 
determines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the 
formal adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the 
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by 
allowing the intervention. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In late August 2000, essentially a year after he filed a petition to 
intervene in the WES Matter,1 Mr. Graham moved from the State of Utah. 
This fact does not alter the present inquiry. Standing, and by analogy, 
intervention, is determined at the time the litigation is commenced. For 
example, Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166 
(Utah 1987) (where case moot, although capable of repetition, plaintiffs did 
not "lose" standing); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services. U.S. , 120 S.Ct. 693,145 L.Ed. 2d 610 (2000) (standing 
determined at the time the complaint was filed). Therefore, the 
determination before this Court remains whether Mr. Graham had the right 
to intervene in the WES matter on September 15,1999, the time he filed his 
petition. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has made clear, standing is determined at 
the time a case is filed. Thus, in Bullock, the Court determined that the 
Society of Professional Journalists could challenge a district court order 
closing a competency proceeding to the public and sealing a related 
transcript and memorandum on the basis of the "capable of repetition by 
1
 In the Matter of: Davis Country Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery 
Special Service District d/b/a Wasatch Energy Systems (No. 99030004) 
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evading review" doctrine. Bullock at 1169 (in cases involving pretrial 
proceedings, that there will not be sufficient time for appellate court to 
intervene justifies an exception to the mootness doctrine). The Court did 
this even though the competency proceeding had concluded. Therefore, to 
address the Society's challenge, the Court clearly had found that the Society 
had standing at the time the case was filed - before the competency 
proceeding had concluded. Indeed, if standing were not fixed at the time of 
the commencement of action, no exception to the mootness doctrine could 
exist - otherwise, plaintiff would always "lose" standing when she "lost" her 
case to mootness and the Court would lose jurisdiction over the case. See 
also Laidlaw. U.S. , 120 S.Ct. 693, 708-09,145 L.Ed. 2d 610, 632 
(the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness could 
not exist if standing were not fixed at the commencement of litigation). 
By analogy, the facts establishing whether Mr. Graham had the right 
to intervene in the WES matter were fixed as of September 1999. As a 
result, all the allegations regarding his substantial legal interests in the WES 
matter remain fixed and are not dependent on where he now lives.2 
2
 In addition, Mr. Graham states that, if granted intervention, he will participate in the 
administrative proceeding. In the alternative, Families Against Incinerator Risk, which 
brought a federal case jointly with Mr. Graham to challenge the WES Incinerator's illegal 
emissions under the Clean Air Act and of which Mr. Graham is a member, would 
substitute itself for Mr. Graham during the proceeding. 
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Finally, to refuse to address this matter on the basis of Mr. Graham's 
relocation would be to reward the Air Board for its delay tactics and its 
frustration of justice. Already, one year has passed since Mr. Graham 
petitioned it for the right to intervene in the WES matter. During this period, 
the Air Board has filed two motions, each of which delayed Mr. Graham's 
petition for review and each of which was rejected soundly by this Court. 
However, the Air Board's own attempts to delay this petition for 
review should not serve as the basis for a dismissal of the action. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has determined, it could not give an agency incentives 
to cut off a petition to intervene. Millard County v. Utah State Tax 
Commission. 823 P.2d 459,461 (Utah 1991). Thus, in determining whether 
a settlement would moot a petition to intervene, the Court reasoned that 
[t]o allow a settlement between parties to moot an extant appeal 
concerning intervention of right might well provide incentives for 
settlement that would run contrary to the interests of justice. 
Id at 461, quoting Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Jennings. 816 F.2d 
1488, 1491 (10th Cir. 1987). Similarly, this Court should not allow the Air 
Board to "circumvent the statutory right of intervention" by delaying Mr. 
Graham's petition for review with repeated motions made without basis. Id. 
at 462. To do otherwise would allow the Air Board to "deal with such 
5 
motions [to intervene] in a fashion that undermines the purpose of the 
statutory scheme for intervention." Id.3 
In sum, that Mr. Graham has left Utah does not alter the present 
inquiry - whether Mr. Graham established the basis to intervene in the WES 
matter as of September 15,1999. Intervention is established at the time the 
petition is made. In the present case, as further established below, because 
Mr. Graham so clearly had a right to intervene in the WES matter when he 
made his petition, he is entitled to a determination of that right. 
RESPONSE TO AIR BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The focus of the Air Board's statement of facts illustrates quite clearly 
its misapplication of the standard for intervention. Hoping to justify its 
denial of Mr. Graham's petition to intervene, the Air Board centers on two 
aspects of the record it believes to be telling: 1) that Mr. Graham failed to 
allege facts to show that emissions from the WES Incinerator affected his 
health and the environment; and, 2) that Mr. Graham failed to demonstrate 
3
 In addition, under Cache County v. Property Tax Division of Utah State Tax 
Commission. 922 P.2d 758, 766 (Utah 1996), Utah Courts will resolve a theoretically 
moot issue "due to its continuing controversy." Because under the Air Board's current 
policy toward intervention no member of public could intervene in a formal adjudication 
before the Board, the issue before this Court is of continuing controversy and should 
therefore be addressed squarely. 
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that his interests in the WES matter were somehow different than those of 
the general public. Importantly, the Air Board's characterization of the facts 
is misguided for two reasons. First, Mr. Graham did allege facts sufficient 
to show that his "legal interests" would be "substantially affected by the 
formal adjudicative proceeding," Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9, and he 
specifically need not show harm to his health and the environment. Second, 
although Mr. Graham is not required to do so, he did distinguish his interest 
in the WES matter from that of the general public. 
The gist of the Air Board's attack on the adequacy of the facts 
establishing Mr. Graham's right to intervene seems to be based on the 
mistaken belief that he must satisfy the "injury in fact" prong of the federal 
standing requirement. Initially, of course, as Mr. Graham repeats throughout 
his opening brief, the proper inquiry in this matter must be whether he meets 
the Utah statutory requirement for intervention, not standing. Moreover, to 
the extent that the federal standing inquiry is instructive, Mr. Graham has 
shown conclusively in his opening brief that he qualifies under every prong 
of the three-part "or" test relevant to determining standing under Article V 
of the Utah Constitution.
 1S'eeBriefofPetitionerat28-37. Finally, even 
if it were instructive to the present task, an examination of the federal 
"injury in fact" test concludes that Mr. Graham has met this requirement. 
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For example, several federal courts that have recognized that 
breathing polluted air is sufficient to confer standing under the Clean Air 
Act. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection 
Agency. 507 F.2d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding no doubt that plaintiff 
will suffer injury if compelled to breathe air less pure than that mandated by 
the Clean Air Act); Texans United for a Safe Economy Education Fund v. 
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. 207 F.3d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that plaintiffs exposed to sulfurous odors while in the home, yard, or driving 
through town have suffered injury in fact). Additionally, federal courts have 
ruled that living in close proximity to air pollution is, in itself, sufficient to 
confer standing under the Clean Air Act. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus. 602 
F.Supp. 892 (N.D.CA 1984) (declaration that member lived in close 
proximity to specific facilities that emit radionuclides more than adequately 
illustrates threat of injury for establishing standing). 
Generally, as the United States Supreme Court recently held, 
"environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that 
they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic and 
recreational values of the area will be lessened' by the challenged activity." 
Laidlaw, U.S. at , 120 S.Ct. at 705,145 L.Ed. 2d at 628, quoting 
Sierra Club v. Morton. 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972). Indeed, the Supreme 
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Court explicitly rejected the notion that to establish standing, plaintiffs must 
show injury to the environment. Id, U.S. at , 120 S.Ct. at 704,145 
L.Ed. 2d at 627. Rather, plaintiffs need only show injury to themselves -
and this injury need not be in the form of verified health risks. Id. Thus, in 
the highly relevant context of allegations of excessive discharges of water 
pollution, Laidlaw found standing based on affiants' assertions that their 
"reasonable concerns about the effects of th[ese] discharges, directly 
affected those affiants' recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests." Id.. 
U.S. at , 120 S.Ct. at 705,145 L.Ed. 2d at 629. 
Applying this analysis to the present case, Mr. Graham has plainly 
established injury in fact. He stated that he lived in very close proximity of 
WES and was thereby exposed to the Incinerator's (allegedly) excessive 
emission of dioxin/furan. Furthermore, as in Ruckelshaus. simply by virtue 
of living near the Incinerator, Mr. Graham is exposed to and injured by the 
relevant pollution. Finally, as plaintiffs in Laidlaw. Mr. Graham stated that 
his reasonable concerns regarding the WES Incinerator emissions - that they 
adversely impact his health, his garden produce and the ecosystem of the 
Great Salt Lake - likewise directly affected his aesthetic and recreational 
sensibilities. For example, Record at 7, Tf 4 ("I am concerned about the 
effect of air emission from the incinerator on the air quality and on my 
9 
health"); f10 ("I feel the garbage incinerator facility and its air emission 
threaten the Great Salt Lake. I love the Great Salt Lake, and watch birds on 
the Lake, which is an important feeding ground for millions of migratory 
birds of many varieties"). 
Mr. Graham's injuries are also "fairly traceable" to WES and its 
Incinerator. Mr. Graham has alleged, and the Board did not contest, that "air 
emissions from the [WES] facility are carried by the wind . . . to my house 
and garden, and to Layton and to the Great Salt Lake." Record at 7, f 6. 
Again, as in Ruckelshaus. that dioxin/furans are invisible and do not have an 
odor, like radionuclides, does not prevent Mr. Graham from tracing his 
injury to the Incinerator. 
With regard to its second misunderstanding - that Mr. Graham must 
prove that his interests are somehow different from those of the general 
public - the Air Board is also off track. Again, the Air Board is applying the 
wrong test to the present inquiry. Under the statutory provision, Mr. 
Graham is entitled to intervene where he alleges that his "legal interests" 
would be "substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding." 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9. Plainly, the statute mentions nothing about 
requiring petitioners to establish that their legal interests are unique or that 
their legal interests are affected in a unique way that distinguishes them from 
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the general public. Moreover, to the extent that it is informative to the 
present inquiry, Utah's standing inquiry provides for standing exactly in the 
circumstances where the plaintiffs interests are identical to those of the 
general public. Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry. 716 P.2d 
796, 799 (Utah 1986) (if plaintiff does not meet the first criterion, he or she 
has standing "if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case 
and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff 
has standing to raise the issue"); see, Brief of Petitioner at 32-34. Even 
assuming that Mr. Graham's interests are the same as the general public's as 
the Air Board suggests, no other petitioner has a greater interest than he 
does. Thus, under Terracor. Mr. Graham has standing based on the interests 
he alleged to the Air Board in his petition to intervene. Finally, Mr. 
Graham's interests are readily distinguished from those of the general public 
- inter alia, Mr. Graham lives and eats produce from a garden located 2.5 
miles from the incinerator. 
In sum, the Air Board's statement of facts exposes its 
misunderstanding of the inquiry relevant to determining when a petitioner 
has the right to intervene. The Air Board's characterization of the facts also 
reveals its mistaken notions of what qualifies as the basis for standing under 
Utah and federal constitutional law. 
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Finally, in its statement of facts, the Air Board fails to point out that, 
because it did not contest Mr. Graham's assertions or otherwise consider 
evidence that counters his statements, the Board must take Mr. Graham's 
allegations as true. This is because, as the Air Board oft repeats, this is an 
on the record case, and the Board did not consider any evidence that 
counters Mr. Graham's assertions. Rather, the approach the Board adopted 
was one that was based on accepting Mr. Graham's allegations as true, while 
still denying him the right to intervene. Because the alleged facts establish 
Mr. Graham's right to intervene, the Air Board's denial of that right is an 
erroneous interpretation of the law and should be overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
The Air Board's argument does nothing to alter the conclusion that 
Mr. Graham is entitled to intervene in the WES matter. As established in his 
opening brief, Mr. Graham is entitled to intervene because he adequately 
alleged that his "legal interests" were "substantially affected by the formal 
adjudicative proceeding". Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9. 
As he previously argued, Mr. Graham is exactly the type of intervenor 
the legislature anticipated should be involved in the Board's formal 
adjudication. As already argued, the Board's reasoning otherwise -
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particularly that Mr. Graham separate his interests from those of the public -
is flawed. First, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9(2) says nothing about 
comparing Mr. Graham's affected interests to the interests of anyone else 
and no such comparison is valid. An intervenor need not distinguish her or 
his interest from that of the general public. 
Second, even under the standards used by the Board, Mr. Graham 
qualifies for intervention - his interest in the matter is different and more 
substantially affected than the interest of the general public. As Mr. Graham 
made clear, he lives but 2 Vi miles from the facility and is therefore "more" 
impacted by WES's excessive emissions than all members of the public who 
live and/or spend less time further away from the Incinerator. Record at 7. 
Mr. Graham not only lives and breathes the air 2.5 miles from the WES 
facility, but he also eats vegetables, fruit, and herbs that he grows in his 
backyard garden 2.5 miles from the facility. Record at 7. Again, Mr. 
Graham has alleged an interest that he does not necessarily share with the 
general public. 
Furthermore, as stated in his affidavit, Mr. Graham watches and 
appreciates birds on the Great Salt Lake and its tributary streams, important 
feeding grounds and rest stops for millions of migratory and resident birds. 
Record at 7. Again, Mr. Graham has distinguished his interests from the 
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general public. This is particularly true if all of Mr. Graham's allegations 
are taken in concert - the location of his home, his garden and his concern 
regarding the fate of the Great Salt Lake birds. There are few, if any, 
individuals in Utah that share all of these interests with Mr. Graham.4 
The Air Board's arguments that Mr. Graham does not have standing 
to participate in the WES matter are also unpersuasive and do nothing to 
undermine the soundness of Mr. Graham's qualifications for standing as 
presented in his opening brief. SeeBriefofPetitionerat28-37. As; Mr. 
Graham already established, Utah's doctrine of standing is expansive and is 
not limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Article III of the 
United States Constitution. Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986). 
To this end, the Utah Supreme Court has set forth three standards for 
determining whether a litigant has standing. See Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 
1145,1150 (Utah 1983). Importantly, if any of these conditions are met, the 
litigant must be allowed access to the courts. Id. First, plaintiff has 
standing if she or he can demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that 
4
 The Air Board seems to imply that Mr. Graham must be the "best" intervenor. But this 
is an impossible (and unconstitutional) test. Someone who lived 100 feet from the 
Incinerator and never left home may not be the best intervenor if someone else lives 50 
feet from the Incinerator and never leaves home. 
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gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." 
Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799 (quoting Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d at 1150). 
Second, if the plaintiff does not meet the first criterion, he or she has 
standing "if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and 
the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff has 
standing to raise the issue." Terracor. 716 P.2d at 799. Third, a plaintiff 
who meets neither of the above criteria nonetheless has standing "if the 
issues are unique and of such great importance that they ought to be decided 
in furtherance of the public interest". Id. 
As he has already shown, on the basis of his allegations to the Air 
Board, Mr. Graham has standing to participate in the WES matter under 
each of these standards. As he alleged, Mr. Graham suffered distinct and 
palpable injury from WES's emissions. At the very least, Mr. Graham 
adequately alleged that his reasonable concerns regarding the effect of the 
Incinerator emission on him, his garden and the Great Salt Lake adversely 
impacted his aesthetic and recreational sensibilities. 
Moreover, it would be difficult to find a plaintiff who had a greater 
interest in the WES matter given the cumulative effect of the location of his 
home, the exposure of this garden and his concern with and sensitivity for 
the Great Salt Lake ecosystem. Indeed, the Air Board completely failed to 
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suggest an individual or type of individual who had more of an interest in 
the WES matter than Mr. Graham. The Air Board also failed to note how 
the issues relative to a property owner living near the Incinerator would be 
addressed should Mr. Graham and his ilk be denied intervention (or 
standing). 
Finally, Mr. Graham raises unique issues of great public importance. 
The polluting of the heavily populated Wasatch Front and the critical Great 
Salt Lake ecosystem with deadly carcinogens and the failure of the Air 
Board to protect the public health and environment is certainly a matter of 
great public importance. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, under the standard for intervention and for standing, Mr. 
Graham is entitled to participate in open government and agency-decision 
making in the manner the Utah Legislature intended when it provided for 
intervention in formal agency adjudications. For this reason, the Air Board's 
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decision to deny Mr. Graham's petition to intervene should be overturned, 
and Mr. Graham's petition should be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 16th day of October 2000. 
JORO WALKER 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
MARK GRAHAM 
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